Power Sharing Agreement In South Sudan

Thijs Van Laer of the International Refugee Rights Initiative, an interest group, lamented that the agreement was not a reference to accountability. In the face of these conceptual and contextual incongruities, this article argues that the current ethnopolitical uncertainty and turbulence in South Sudan cannot be solved solely by formal governance institutions. In addition, this conceptual indifritude has made it more difficult for scientists to explore other models of conflict resolution, since much attention has been paid to the administration`s Anglo-Egyptian condominium policy 1 (Collins 1983:470). As a starting point for this historical erudition, we begin our analysis with the understanding that South Sudan suffers from reflections characterized by political insolvency and economic stagnation and which often reinforce each other at the expense of peace and stability. This ethnopolitical manipulation led to a constellation of ethnic powers (Oxford 2003:149); United States Central Intelligence Agency [US CIA] 2011; Kalyvas 2006). The ethnocentric form of governance has grown considerably and the benefits of the formation of the South Sudan Conflict Resolution Agreement (ARCSS) in 2013. The country has simply sunk into what Thandika Mkandawire (2015:570) calls “neo-trimonialism”.” As such, opportunities can only be exploited by belonging to a tribal house (Zambakari 2013:10). The worrying relationship between President Salva Kiir and his former Vice-President, Dr Riek Machar, is a condition of the conflict situation in the Republic of South Sudan. It was this ambiguous relationship that described the intra-South South African conflict as “ethnocentric”.

The country has experienced persistent conflicts, but also limited peacetimes. Nevertheless, the historic “struggle for power” within military, political, territorial and economic structures continues to entangle the country in humanitarian and development crises (Madut and Hutchinson 1999:126); Kuol 2016:6). Although some scholars such as Clemence Pinaud (2014:193) have argued that the problem of South Sudan cannot be compared to “ethnicity”, it is equally important to testify that, in this “system of ethnic domination”, tensions appear along the deeply rooted dividing lines: 1) ethnicity; 2) socio-economic differentiation; and 3) loyalty reinforced by Big Man syndrome. Contrary to this argument, Jurg Steiner (1981:1245) notes that, instead of focusing solely on the ethnic divisions of a society, “levels of cultural segmentation” should also be studied in the field of conszialism (Mehler 2009b:455).